Denktash, TRNC and the National Will at   Negotiations

Fuat Aksu*

While the debate over the resolution of the Cyprus problem continues, new problems emerge for both parties. Who will assume political responsibility before the public in the event of rejection of the resolutionplan? It is not possible to suggest that the plan offered by the UN Secretary General totally meets the sensitivities of either one of the parties. Although the third plan contains conditions that appear alluring to parties, it is still far from entirely removing all the essential worries.

On the other hand, that the plan be submitted for simultaneous referenda in both sides of the island on March 30th even if no agreement for a permanent resolution comes out of negotiations initiates an additional debate. Such a move means exerting pressure on and ignoring political authority shaped by present constitutional structures and national sovereignty from the perspective of both parties. Only national parliaments upon the request of national governments can take a decision on holding a referendum. It is unacceptable for anything to exert pressure on national authorities.

From this angle, views expressed by President Sezer as well as by TGNA during TRNC President Denktash’s visit to Turkey demonstrate that TRNC and Denktash as its representative are not on their own in the negotiation process. This support is also significant for it demonstrates that the responsibility for policies being pursued at negotiations is shared as well. At the same time, it is hard to suggest that JDP Chairman R.T. Erdogan shares all of the views expressed by the parliament. For this reason, we will need to wait and see if the foreign policy of the new government formed after the Siirt by-election and Erdogan’s attitude will change. However, it needs to remembered that sharp and radical transformations are not possible in the fundamental characteristics and vital priorities of Turkish foreign policy even though governments change. Although new governments have deviated from these characteristics from time to time, they eventually get back on track after a while.

Indeed, views that will be expressed by TRNC after the meeting at the Hague on March 10th will also be the views of Turkey and this strengthens the position of Denktash during negotiations. On the other hand,  Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA), given its discomfort with the plan, will pursue strategies aimed at attributing responsibility to the Turkish side. In any case, if the Annan plan is submitted for referenda in  both sides on March 30th as required by the calendar,  then the type of question formulated for those referenda will become significant. It will be very decisive on preferences, hence on results, if the  referenda include a vote on full membership of the federal state that will be instituted to the EU. Within the GCA, there is support and willingness for full membership to the EU parallel to the reaction to Annan plan. And this will mean that voters will need to choose between the plan and membership and/or reject or accept both. In the event that there is no vote on the plan, then no obstacle will remain for GCA’s full membership and the Greek Cypriot society will accept EU membership independently of the plan.

Undoubtedly, not only will it not be not possible for  the Turkish Cypriot community to join EU as part of the prospective federal state in this case but also how membership will be possible in the future will be in doubt. Similar concerns hold for Turkey as well within this framework. However, that EU membership is  linked to resolution creates a conditional relationship and abolishes the principle of equality that is  necessary for reconciliation from the outset. In fact,  the destruction of the equality principle and the desire  of the EU to legitimate this through the UN reinforce non-resolution. It should be noted that both parties accept the plan as a basis for negotiations this way or the other yet state that they need to examine the plan in more detail. Secretary General of the UN and the EU as well have to take this necessity into account.

The referendum issue is important from another point too; what will happen if the Turks or the Greek Cypriots or both reject the plan rather than accept it?  As far as I am concerned, this is the main point to  consider. In that case, the efforts of the UN Secretary General will have yielded no result and the  organization will lose some credibility; yet such a result will also mean the reaffirmation of the division and the existence of two separate political authorities. Turkish side needs to be prepared for this prospect in making plans for the future.

Either way, this advocates and opponents of the plan divide that some seek to create in the Turkish side needs to be removed and the public should be provided with healthy information about the plan. If  the people of TRNC lose their confidence in the government, then political authority will be devoid of popular support and the resultant societal/political antagonisms will only hurt the Turkish side itself. The first step that needs to be taken to prevent this is, irrespective of a referendum, to debate the plan openly before the public and before the parliament in detail and to let the will of the nation shape itself within a democratic structure.

"Denktaş, TRNC and the National Will at Negotiations", Turkishnewsline, 8 March 2003, http://www.turkishnewsline.com/detay.php?detayid=45