The Third Plan of Annan and the Sensibilities of The Turkish Cyprus

Fuat Aksu*

04 March 2003

The revised third plan concerning the island and which was presented on February 26 seems as well away from a full understanding of the Turkish part of the island. Although many requisites stated by Denkta? have been considered, the plan essentially is no more than an imbalance against the Turks in Cyprus.

Eventhough this third plan mentions of the Turkish and Greek States of Cyprus separately as founding states, the plans for the United States of Cyprus which is conceived to be established have no mention of no solid projects to deal with neither the territorial integrity nor the problems that Greeks migrating to the North will rise.

A total agreement on the plan without any consideration for the problems it is prone to bring forth would lead to a process in the end of which the Turkish party will become dependent to the Greek party both economically and politically. According to the latest plan, the Turkish party will hold a 29.2% percentage of the total territory. This means, with regard to the already at hand 35%, a territorial loss which will lead to the migration of Turks of Cyprus further North. Resettlement and employment and compensation of the left-behind assets of these people will need to be handled. No matter what regulations the latest plan suggests, it is obvious that many individual and social problems will rise as the financial aid is not sufficiently clarified considering the compensatory issues which still detain their opacity. On the other hand, the production loss due to cession of Turkish territories to the Greek party in case of agreement on the plan does not seem to be quite compensable in teh short run. As the most of the agriculturally fertile lands will as well be ceded to the Greek party, this will enforce the dependency to the South of the Turkish party unless the conditions of equity are not maintained on these issues. Consequently the gap of income between the two communities will rise and rise and the rulers of the economy of the island will in time turn to be the Greek party who will then be holding these territories. Turks on the other hand, having ceded to the Greek party their agricultural and especially tourism assets will either look for ways of settlement in the South or have to learn to live in the service sector.

As the plan envisages full membership to the EU of the possible ?United States of Cyprus,? the structural problems and issues of financial aid that the Turkish State of Cyprus is likely to face are not still sufficiently clarified and well projected. The EU only promises 206 million euros for the economical development of the re-united Northern Cyprus. This is obviously not enough an amount. This problem is conceived to be overcome by international conferences of financial aid. Although, mention of adoptive facilities we see mentioned in the Founding Pact in order to overcome the economical imbalances between the founding parties as quick as possible, this should be based on solid financial aid and projects.

On the other hand, as the responsibilities of the founding parties on sharing the debts from 1964 to the day of establishment of the United States of Cyprus is handled in Annex I/47 of the Pact, each party being responsible for its own community, the payments for the infrastructure and public services for the entirety of the island is left to the responsibility of the Federal Government. Debts to Greece and Turkey for militarisation are to be handled by the founding states separately. This situation seems likely to lead the north undertake the financial burden of development, practically creating a different north and south.

Despite all this opacity, it is still evident to which party the plan be more profitable. Just like its predecessors this latest plan by Annan once more maximises the interests of the Greek party, yet, partially considering the needs of the Turkish party if not at all. Implementations such as the cession of agriculturally fertile lands and water reserves to the Greek party, compensation of the Greek assets in the north which are being used by Turks since 1974, migration to Turkey of many people from the north leads us to the mentioned judgement. This plan, destroying the homogeneity of the post1974 era, is a return to the pre1974 conditions.

What happens in case of rejection of the plan? It is all so clear that in case of the rejection of the plan by one or both of the parties the profitor will always be the Greek party of Cyprus. Neither the ratification nor the rejection of the plan will pose a threat for the Greek party?s acquisition to the EU. Thus, as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will not be accepted to the European Union alongside with the Greek party, the segregation on the island will enter a new path. If this be the case, the mission for both for Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus would become the implementation of projects for economical and political growth and international promotion of the Turkish Cyprus. This requires the participation of the bussiness class together with the politicians and publics of both countries.

Another advantageous point in the rejection of the Annan plan would be the facilitation of the sharing of the maritime jurisdictional areas in the Mediterranean between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. As issues such as the continental shelf, territorial waters, the restricted economical and adjacent zones, FIR responsibilities and air fields which are given under the responsibility of the Federal State in the plan will remain in the hands of Northern Cyprus, the possibility of a partnership of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the North Mediterranean is likely.

What we witness today in Cyprus is a division of sovereignity. Takign the daily interests into consideration instead of the longterm gains would lead one to failure. Within the present framework, what is discussed is the balance of the Lausanne; Article No. 16 of the Lausanne.

"The Third Plan of Annan and the Sensibilities of The Turkish Cyprus", Turkishnewsline, 4 March 2003, http://www.turkishnewsline.com/detay.php?detayid=24