Türkiye - Yunanistan İlişkilerinde Doğu Akdeniz Deniz Yetki Alanları Uyuşmazlığı

1970'li yıllarda Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasında deniz yetki alanlarına ilişkin temel uyuşmazlık alanı büyük ölçüde Ege Denizi üzerinden şekillenmiştir. 1990'lardan itibaren ise buna ek olarak Doğu Akdeniz de uyuşmazlığın bir boyutu olarak eklenmiştir. 2000'lerde ise Ege'de Bern Deklarasyonu'nun sağladığı moratoryum sürmekle birlikte rekabet ve meydan okuma büyük ölçüde Doğu Akdeniz'de gerçekleşmektedir. Başlangıçta her ne kadar KRY'nın faaliyetleri bağlamında gerçekleştiği için Yunanistan açıktan Türkiye'yle bu konuda bir çatışmanın tarafı olarak gözükmek istememiş KRY'nin faaliyetlerini desteklemek ve AB platformunda bu desteği işlevselleştirmekle ilgilenmiştir. İlerleyen süreçte ise bu çizgisini değiştirmiş ve Türkiye ile açık bir meydan okumaya yönelmiştir. 

THE AKRITAS PLAN

TOP SECRET                                                    FROM HEADQUARTERS

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The recent public statements of the Archbishop have prescribed the course which our national issue will follow in the immediate future. As we have stressed in the past, national struggles are neither judged nor solved from day to day, nor is it always possible to fix definite time limits for the achievement of the various stages of their development. Our national cause must always be judged in the light of the conditions and developments of the moment; the measures which will be taken, the tactics and the time of implementing each measure is determined by the conditions existing at the time, both internationally, and internally. The entire effort is trying and must pass through various stages, because the factors which influence the final result are many and varied. It must be understood by everyone that each measure taken is the result of continuous studies and, in the meantime, forms the basis for future measures. It must be recognized that the measures which are prescribed now constitute only the first step, one simple stage towards the final and unalterable national objective, to the full and unfettered exercise of the right of self-determination of the people.

Since the purpose remains unalterable, what remains to be examined is the subject of tactics. This must necessarily be separated as internal and external (international), since in each case both the handling and the presentation of our cause will be different.

A. EXTERNAL TACTICS (INTERNATIONAL)

During the recent stages of our national struggle the Cyprus problem has been presented to world public opinion and diplomatic circles as a demand for the exercise of the right of self-determination of the people of Cyprus. In the exercise of this right, the subject of the Turkish minority was introduced under the well-known conditions and with the argument of violent intercommunal clashes, it had been tried to make it accepted that co-existence of the two communities under a united administration was impossible. Finally, for many international circles the problem was solved by the London and Zurich Agreements, a solution which was presented as the result of negotiations and agreement between the contending parties.

a) Consequently, our first target has been to cultivate internationally the impression that the Cyprus problem has not really been solved and the solution requires revision.

b) First objective was our endeavour to be vindicated as the Greek majority and to create the impression that:

(i) the solution given is neither satisfactory nor fair;

(ii) the agreement reached was not the result of a free and voluntary acceptance of a compromise of the conflicting views;

(iii) the revision of the agreements constitutes a compelling necessity for survival, and not an effort of the Greeks to repudiate their signature;

(iv) the co-existence of the two communities is possible, and

(v) the strong element on which foreign states ought to rely is the Greek majority and not the Turks.

c) All the above which required very difficult effort, have been achieved to a satisfactory degree. Most of the diplomatic representatives are already convinced that the solution given was neither fair nor satisfactory, that it was signed under pressure and without real negotiations and that it was imposed under various threats. The fact that the solution has not been ratified by the people, is a significant argument in this connection, because our leadership, acting wisely, avoided calling the people to give its official approval to the agreement by a plebiscite or otherwise, which the people, in the 1959 spirit, would have definitely approved. Generally, it has been established that the administration of Cyprus up to now has been carried out by the Greeks and that the Turks was confined to a negative role and acted as a brake.

d) Second objective. The first stage having been completed, we must programme the second stage of our activities and objectives on the international field. In general terms, these objectives can be outlined as follows:

(i) The efforts of the Greeks are to remove unreasonable and unfair provisions of the administration and not to oppress the Turks;

(ii) The removal of these factors of the administration must take place today because tomorrow will be too late.

(iii) The removal of these provisions of the administration, although it is reasonable and necessary, is not possible because of the unreasonable attitude of the Turks and therefore, since it is not possible by agreement with the Turks, unilateral action is justified;

(iv) The issue of revision is an internal affair of the Cypriots and does not give the right of intervention, by force or otherwise, to anyone;

(v) The proposed amendments are reasonable, just, and safeguard the reasonable rights of the minority.

e) It has been generally proven that today the international climate is against every type of oppression and especially the oppression of minorities. The Turks have already succeeded in persuading international opinion that union of Cyprus with Greece amounts to an attempt to enslave them. Further, it is judged that we have greater possibilities of succeeding in our efforts to influence international public opinion in our favour if we present our demand, as we did during the struggle, as a demand for exercising the right of self-determination, rather than as a demand for Enosis. However, in order to secure the right to exercise complete and free self-determination, first of all, we must get rid of all those provisions of the Constitution and of the Agreements (Treaty of Guarantee, Treaty of Alliance etc) which obstruct the free and unfettered expression and implementation of the wishes of our people and which may open the way to dangers of external intervention. It is exactly for this reason that the first target of attack has been the Treaty of Guarantee, which was the first that was stated to be no longer recognised by the Greek Cypriots.

When this is achieved no power, legal or moral, can stop us from deciding our future alone and freely and exercising the right of self-determination by a plebiscite.

From the above, the conclusion can be drawn that for the success of our plan a chain of actions and developments is needed, each of which is a necessity and a must, otherwise, future actions will remain legally unjustified and politically unattainable, while at the same time we will expose the people and the country to serious consequences. The actions to be taken can be classified under the following headings:

a) Amendment of the negative elements of the Agreements and parallel abandonment in practice of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. This step is necessary because the need for amendments of the negative aspects of the treaties is generally accepted internationally and is considered justified (we can even justify unilateral action), while at the same time external intervention to prevent us amending them is held unjustified and inapplicable;

b) After the above actions, the Treaty of Guarantee (the right of intervention) becomes legally and substantially inapplicable;

c) Once Cyprus is not bound by the restrictions (of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance) regarding the exercise of the right of self-determination, the people will be free to give expression to and implement their desire.

d) Legal confrontation by the forces of State (police and even friendly military forces) of every internal or external intervention because then we shall be completely independent.

Therefore the actions from (a) to (d) are absolutely necessary and must be carried out in the above order and in time.

It is therefore obvious that if we hope to have any possibility of success internationally in our above actions, we cannot and must not reveal or declare the various stages of the struggle before the previous one is completed. For instance, if it is accepted that the above four stages are the necessary course, then it is unthinkable to speak of amendments (stage (a)) if stage (d) is revealed. How can it be possible to aim at the amendment of the negative aspects by arguing that this is necessary for the functioning of the State and the Agreements.

The above relate to targets, aims and tactics in the international field. And now on the internal front:

B. INTERNAL FRONT

The internal actions are judged by the interpretations that will be given to them internationally and by the effects that our actions will have on our national cause.

1. The only danger which could be described as insurmountable is the possibility of external intervention. Not so much because of material damage, nor because of the danger itself (which, in the last analysis, it is possible for us to deal with partly or totally by force), but mainly because of the possible political consequences. If intervention is threatened or implemented before stage (c), then such intervention would be legally debatable, if not justified. This fact has a lot of weight both internationally and in the United Nations. From the history of many recent instances we have learnt that in not a single case of intervention, even when legally unjustified, has either the United Nations or any other power succeeded in evicting the attacker without serious concessions detrimental to the victim. Even in the case of the Israeli attack against Suez, which was condemned by almost all nations and on which Soviet intervention was threatened, Israel withdrew, but received (kept) the port of Eilat on the Red Sea as a concession. Naturally, much more serious dangers exist for Cyprus.

But if we consider and justify our actions under (a) above well, on the one hand the intervention will not be justified and, on the other, we will have every support from the beginning, since by the Treaty of Guarantee, intervention cannot take place before consultations between the Guarantor Powers, that is Britain, Greece and Turkey. It is at this stage of consultations (before intervention) that we need international support. We shall have it if the amendments proposed by us appear reasonable and justifiable.

Hence, the first objective is to avoid intervention by the choice of the amendments we would propose in the first stage.

Tactics: Reasonable Constitutional amendments after efforts for common understanding with the Turks are exhausted. Since common agreement is impossible we shall try to justify unilateral action. At this stage the provisions in (ii) and (iii) of page 21 are applicable in parallel.

2. It is obvious that for intervention to be justified, more serious reasons and a more immediate danger must exist than mere constitutional amendments.

Such reasons could be (a) an immediate declaration of Enosis before stages (a) - (c), (b) serious inter-communal violence which would be presented as massacre of the Turks.

Reason (a) has already been dealt with in the first part and, consequently, only the danger of inter-communal violence remains to be considered. Since we do not intend, without provocation, to massacre or attack Turks, the possibility remains that the Turks, as soon as we proceed to the unilateral amendment of any article of the constitution, will react instinctively, creating incidents and clashes or stage, spurious killings, atrocities or bomb attacks on Turks, in order to create the impression that the Greeks have indeed attacked the Turks, in which case intervention would be imperative, for their protection.

Tactics: Our actions for constitutional amendments will be open and we will always appear ready for peaceful talks. Our actions will not be of a provocative or violent nature. Any incidents that may take place will be met, at the beginning, in a legal fashion by the legal Security Forces, according to the plan. All actions will be clothed in legal form.

3. Before the right of unilateral amendments of the constitution is established and is accepted, decisions and actions which require positive violent acts from us, such as the unification of municipalities, must be avoided. Such a decision compels the Government to intervene by force to bring about the unification and seizure of municipal properties, which will probably compel the Turks to react forcefully. Therefore it is easier for us, using legal methods, to amend, for instance, the provision of the 70 to 30 ratio, when it is the Turks who will have to take positive violent action, while for us this procedure will not amount to action, but a refusal to act. The same applies to the issue of the separate majorities with regards to taxation legislation. These measures have already been studied and a series of similar measures have been decided for implementation. Once our right of unilateral amendments to the constitution is established de facto by some such actions, then we shall be able to advance using our judgment and our strength more forcefully.

4. It is, however, naive to believe that it is possible to proceed to substantive acts of amendment of the constitution, as a first step of our general plan, as has been described above, without the Turks attempting to create or to stage violent clashes. Exactly for this reason, the existence and strengthening of our Organisation is imperative because:

a) In the event of spontaneous Turkish reactions, if our counter-attacks are not immediate, we run the risk of having panic created among Greeks, particularly in the towns, and thus we run the danger of losing substantial vital areas irreparably , while on the other hand an immediate and timely show of our strength may bring the Turks to their senses and confine their actions to insignificant, isolated acts, and

b) In the event of a planned or spurious attack of the Turks, staged or not, it is imperative to overcome it by force in the shortest possible time, because if we succeed in gaining command of the situation in one or two days, no outside intervention would be possible, probable or justifiable.

c) In all the above cases, the forceful and decisive confrontation of any Turkish effort will greatly facilitate our subsequent actions for further Constitutional amendments. It would then be possible for unilateral amendments to be made, without any Turkish reaction, because they will know that their reaction will be impossible or seriously harmful for their community, and

d) In the event of the clashes becoming widespread and general we must be ready to proceed immediately with the actions described in (a) to (d), including the immediate declaration of Enosis, because then there would be no reason to wait nor room for diplomatic action.

5. At all these stages we should not overlook the factor of propaganda, and to counter the propaganda of those who do not know or cannot be expected to know our plans, as well as of the reactionary elements. It has been shown that our struggle must pass through at least four stages and that we must not reveal our plans and intentions publicly and prematurely. Complete discretion and secrecy is more than a national duty. IT IS A VITAL NECESSITY FOR SURVIVAL AND SUCCESS.

This will not deter the reactionaries and the irresponsible demagogues from indulging in an orgy of exploitation of patriotism and provocations. The plan provides them with fertile ground, because it gives them the opportunity to allege that the efforts of the leadership are confined to the objective of constitutional amendments and not to pure national objectives. Our task becomes more difficult because by necessity, and depending on the prevailing circumstances, even the constitutional amendments must be made in stages. However, all this must not draw us into irresponsible demagogy, street politics or bidding higher in the stakes of nationalism. Our acts will be our most truthful defenders. In any event, because the above task must make substantial progress and yield results long before the next elections, in the relatively short time in between we must show self-restraint and remain cool, for obvious reasons. At the same time, however, we must not only maintain the present unity and discipline of the patriotic forces, but increase it. We can only achieve this by the necessary briefing of our members and through them of our people.

Before everything else we have to expose the true identities of the reactionaries. They are petty and irresponsible demagogues and opportunists, as their recent past has shown. They are negative and aimless reactionaries who fanatically oppose our leadership, but at the same time without offering a substantive and practical solution of their own. In order to promote all our actions we need a steady and strong government until the last moment. These are known as verbalists and sloganists, with pretty words and slogans, but they are unable and unwilling to proceed to concrete acts or to suffer sacrifices. For example, even at the present stage they offer nothing more concrete than recourse to the United Nations, that is, words again without cost to themselves. They must, therefore, be alienated and isolated.

In parallel and at the same time, we shall brief our members about the above plan and intentions, but ONLY VERBALLY. Our Sub-headquarters must, in gatherings of our members, analyse and explain fully and continuously the above, until each one of our members understands fully and is in a position to brief others. NO WRITTEN REPORT IS PERMITTED. THE LOSS OR LEAKAGE OF ANY DOCUMENT ON THE ABOVE AMOUNTS TO HIGH TREASON. No act can damage our struggle as vitally and decisively as the revealing of the present document or its publication by our opponents.

With the exception of word-of-mouth briefing and guidance, all our other actions, specially publications in the press, resolutions etc, must be very restrained and no mention of the above should be made. Similarly, in public speeches and gatherings, only responsible persons may make, under the personal responsibility of the Chief of Sub-headquarters, references in general terms to the above plan. And this only after the explicit approval of the Chief of Sub-headquarters who will also control the text. Even in this case, ON NO ACCOUNT ARE REFERENCES TO THESE TEXTS IN THE PRESS OR ANY OTHER PUBLICATION ARE PERMITTED.

Tactics: All the briefing of our people and of the public BY WORD OF MOUTH. We should make every effort to appear as moderates in public. Projection of or reference to our plans in the press or in writing is strictly prohibited. Officials and other responsible persons will continue to brief the people and to raise their morale and fighting spirit, but such briefing excludes making our plans public knowledge by the press or otherwise.

NOTE: This document will be destroyed by fire on the personal responsibility of the Chief of Regional HQ, in the presence of all the General Staff within 10 days from its receipt. Copies in full or in part are prohibited. Members of the staff of the Regional HQ may have the plan on the personal responsibility of the Chief of Regional HQ, but may not take it out of the Regional HQ.

The Chief

 AKRITAS

Kıta Sahanlığının Saptanması Sorunu

Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasındaki ilişkileri etkilemesi bakımından Ege Denizi kıta sahanlığı sorunu yakın bir geçmişe sahiptir. Ege Denizi'nde 1960'ların başlarından itibaren Yunanistan'ın sismografik araştırmalar ve petrol arama faaliyetleri yürütmesine karşın 1 Kasım 1973 tarihinde Türkiye’nin, Ege Denizi’nin 27 bölgesinde TPAO’ya petrol arama izni vermesi, Türk - Yunan ilişkilerinde yeni bir uyuşmazlığa yol açmıştır.[1]

 KIBRIS SORUNU

Lozan Barış Antlaşması’nın imzalanmasıyla, İngiltere’nin, Kıbrıs üzerindeki fiili egemenliği, hukuki bir dayanağa kavuşturulduktan sonra, Türkiye ve Yunanistan, bu statüye sadık davranışlar sergilemiştir. İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında ise, Oniki Adaların Yunanistan’a verilmesiyle birlikte, Kıbrıs konusunda da bazı ulusçu beklentiler gündeme gelmiştir.